



Image 8. Beiting Village.

The Beginning of the End: Planning the Destruction of Guangzhou's Urban Villages

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During the mid-1980s, a new phenomenon appeared in the central districts of Guangzhou City: the urban village (*chengzhongcun*). These distinctive settlements, whose dense clusters of tiny buildings were immediately recognizable in the skyline, were an anomaly in a rapidly modernizing city. They were remnants of the agricultural villages that had once occupied most of the territory surrounding Guangzhou's relatively small urban core. As the municipal government appropriated their farmland, the city grew around the villages, leaving them trapped inside their new boundaries. The former peasants reinvented themselves as landlords, catering to the waves of migrants who regularly arrived in Guangzhou from rural villages all over China. These two groups of officially rural residents lived in the most urban condition imaginable.

The villages' visibility and unique form, completely at odds with every other urban dynamic in China, attracted considerable attention. Although many Guangzhou natives regarded them with suspicion as hotbeds of crime and disorder, they became an object of fascination for social scientists, urban scholars, and even tourists. Researchers from China and abroad probed the unusual set of circumstances that had produced them and arrived

at contradictory conclusions.¹ Architects and planners from all over the world brought students to document and analyze their intricate morphology.²

However, in 2000, the Guangzhou municipal government mandated their destruction. Their stated goal was to eliminate all 138 of the urban villages in Guangzhou's central districts by 2015.³ They slated a subgroup of villages including such large and prominent villages as Leide, Linhe, and Shipai for immediate destruction, a task that became more urgent as the city began to prepare for the 2010 Asian Games. The prestige brought by hosting the games intensified the government's upgrading and beautification efforts. Based on the city's timetable, these villages had survived as urban entities for only three decades. This chapter describes the processes that led to their disappearance, illuminates Chinese urban planning initiatives and looks ahead towards the future of thousands of villages within the Guangzhou's borders. We argue that the destruction of these village represents a major loss to the city and its inhabitants, and propose new urban values to guide Guangzhou's continuing development.

From Rural to Urban, from Lineage to Corporation

The unique social, spatial, economic and political circumstances of urban villages are the product of a complex and layered past. The key elements of this history are briefly sketched here. Before 1949, most existed as small but productive agricultural settlements. As "lineage villages," typical of the Pearl River Delta, their residents defined themselves by one

or more shared surnames. Tracing the history of their village to a common ancestor, they continuously recorded extensive genealogies and kept them in their village ancestral halls. Scholars have emphasized how the close connection between lineage structures and landholding produced a powerful bond between culture and territory, shared by both landlords and peasants.⁴

The tumultuous changes of the Maoist era, characterized by abrupt shifts in agricultural and political policies imposed from above, added a strong legacy of rural collective ownership. In 1956 the Central Government collectivized village farmland and organized villagers into cooperatives. The "Great Leap Forward" consolidated numerous village collectives into huge "people's communes" with disastrous results for agriculture. In response, the government redrew the boundaries of existing villages (now called "natural" villages) in 1961, in order to create smaller units or "production brigades," which were composed of a series of "production teams."

After 1978, the Central Government partially privatized land-use rights through the household responsibility system.⁵ They dismantled the communes to create townships, villages, and village groups. Village collectives retained ownership of village land but allowed individual households to build their own houses and control their allocated farmland. In 1982, as part of market reforms, all land in China was designated as either urban land that was owned by the state, or rural land owned by rural collectives. These rights established a village's claim to own and control its own land, at least in principle.

Equally significant was the Central Government's imposition of a household registration system (*hukou*) in 1958, with two categories, "urban" and "rural." This was intended to regulate the movement of labor. As part of the state's drive towards industrialization, urban residents had preferential access to economic, social, and cultural benefits. For rural families, the *hukou* system effectively bound them to their village and rural identities. In the case of urban villagers, as the city grew around them, the *hukou* paradoxically reinforced their already strong territorial bond. Since the city came to them, they did not have to leave their land to participate in the new urban economy.⁶

Finally, in the 1990s, village-level elections—the only elections in China—allowed villagers to elect their own village committee and leaders directly. Elections have not necessarily resulted in empowering villagers since party cadres often hold considerable power. However, in many cases, elected village committees have been able to take control of and manage the village's common property.⁷ Accumulated over decades, this combination of rights and restrictions has provided villagers with a degree of economic and political autonomy not shared by Guangzhou's "official" urban residents.

After 1978, as Guangzhou began its explosive growth, the agricultural villages surrounding the city's built-up core constituted the only obstacle to its continuing urban expansion.⁸ However, acquiring land for factories and urban development was not the city's only or even most important incentive for appropriating village farmland. Since the Central Government

allocates municipal funding, the only way a municipal government can generate its own revenue is by obtaining low-value agricultural land, declaring it "development land," and then selling it for a much higher price to factories or developers. The difference goes directly into the city's coffers. Initial attempts to simply seize village land while forcibly relocating villagers produced confrontation and even violent resistance. These events convinced the Guangzhou government, always fearful of social unrest, to take a more conciliatory stance.

They invented a series of policies to allow them to obtain officially "rural" territory legally, involving notable concessions on their part. After appropriating all of a village's land, the Guangzhou government would not only compensate the village for its agricultural land but would then return a certain percentage of the appropriated land as "reserved land." Part of this was designated as "reserved housing sites," which continued the rural practice of individual village households owning and building their own houses. This allowed villagers to continue living in the village. Another portion of land was "reserved construction land." This was collectively owned and could profitably be leased or built on for industrial or commercial purposes. Thus, in addition to a house site and monetary compensation, each villager also received a share of the rent from these construction lands.⁹ Over time, as land in Guangzhou became more valuable, villagers began to demand a considerably larger amount of the appropriated land and the percentage grew from 5 to 12 percent. This arrangement was purely pragmatic. Rather than acknowledging the collective ownership of village land,

which was legally recognized but still ambiguous in practice, the municipal government asserted its control over the land before rezoning it and giving it over to village control. After this, the village operated largely outside of any local planning mandates.¹⁰

As rural migrants from all over China poured into Guangzhou to find work, the newly urbanized villagers extruded their small housing sites vertically. Using reinforced concrete frames, they added new rooms, apartments, and ground floor shops to rent to the newcomers.¹¹ In the densest villages, Linhe and Shipai, they built up to as many as twelve stories—three or four times the legal limit of three stories. As they grew, the villages turned into labyrinths of narrow lanes, snaked with electric wires. Automobiles could not enter these pedestrian spaces which were so congested that residents immediately occupied any open areas as public spaces. Migrants usually outnumbered villagers. Leide's residents included only 4,000 villagers to an estimated 20,000 migrants. Such urban villages provided the only low-cost housing in an increasingly expensive city as well as offering a full range of shops and services. As the villages grew, they became more specialized. Leide's tenants were mostly male workers in low-skilled jobs, primarily from Hunan and Sichuan Provinces. Linhe, located next to a metro station and in close proximity to six universities, attracted college students as well as young white-collar workers who worked in the Tianhe District. Although its rents were higher than those of other urban villages, its living conditions were better and the rent was still one-third to half of those in the surrounding area. Shipai established itself as Guangzhou's sales center

for all kinds of electronic equipment; its shops even set prices at the national level.

Their rental incomes made the villagers in these centrally located urban villages rich. In many cases, their combined rental and share incomes made it unnecessary for them to work. In Leide, for example, 81 percent of the population were jobless, yet their average income in 2005 was 5,475 RMB a month, which was double of what an employed university graduate earned. Three-fourths of this income came from their shares in the village collective, while the rest came from the rents. The village's elected committee managed and distributed their shares. Since the 1990s, the Guangdong government has encouraged villagers to transform themselves into shareholding companies, which corporatize the village assets and hand out shares to villagers. These companies convert their collective assets—mostly the income generated by leasing their collective land—into shares. As

shareholders, villagers will collect the dividends on a permanent basis. This policy ensures a fairer and more transparent distribution of village revenue, which is often a source of serious contention in many villages, while maintaining collective ownership.¹²

Guangzhou Reinvents Itself

During the 1990s, Guangzhou found itself lagging behind in the intense competition between Chinese cities. Although it had been a pioneer in the opening-up period, attracting thousands of businesses and tourists, other cities had surpassed it. Both Beijing and Shanghai became showcases of modern infrastructure, tourist attractions, and gleaming new business districts. Even its neighbors in the Pearl River Delta—Shenzhen and Zhuhai—were rapidly developing as prosperous business centers. Their modern skyscrapers and luxury high-rise apartments contrasted sharply with Guangzhou's aging buildings and lack of cultural and commercial

facilities. In response, the then mayor of Guangzhou envisioned a grandiose new city and in 1994 initiated plans to build completely two new central business districts (CBDs) to replace its aging historical center. Located along a central north-south axis from the Pearl River to the Guangzhou East Train Station, the mayor planned these two areas, New Pearl City and the CBD around the East Train Station in Tianhe District, to reorient and redevelop Guangzhou.¹³

In 1999, during the course of constructing two major freeway projects, the city destroyed the reserved land in several villages. The destruction led to serious conflicts with villagers.¹⁴ As a result, in 2000, the city government concluded that the existence of urban villages was a major impediment to its plans for redevelopment and thus embarked on an ambitious scheme to eliminate all 138 of them by 2010. The mayor (Lin Shusen, mayor from 1997 to 2003) set up a planning group, consisting of the heads of government departments



Image 1. Leide: Ancestor hall in the remaining old village, 2010. Photo by Marco Cenzatti.

such as the Municipal Construction Committee, the Planning Bureau, and the Land Bureau. Since villages were excluded from the national planning structure, the Central Government gave local municipalities considerable freedom in dealing with the redevelopment planning and allowed them to experiment with negotiation and compensation practices. In Guangzhou, the increasing wealth of the urban villages helped improve their negotiating power. They also employed delaying tactics, as they were aware that protests and publicity would strengthen their bargaining power. This forced the government to proceed through persuasion rather than outright coercion.

To counter their demands, the planning group proposed a two-pronged approach. The first step would be to integrate villagers into the urban governance and control system, using the "Four Transformations Principle." The second step was to institute "urban village reconstruction planning" to eliminate the urban village physically. The four transformations, while offering villagers some benefits, were designed to effectively terminate their unique spatial and political "rights", thus undermining much of their power to negotiate with the municipal government. This would be accomplished by (1) giving villagers urban *hukou*; (2) replacing the village committee with a city resident committee;¹⁵ (3) transforming the village collective shareholding system into a corporation with individual shareholders; and (4) transforming collectively owned "village reserved" land to state-owned land.¹⁶ The government had some success with the first three transformations. By the end of 2005, 30 urban villages had transformed their village committees into city residents' committees and had acquired urban

hukou. A thousand and four hundred villages had established shareholding companies.¹⁷

Changing land ownership and implementing the reconstruction process was more challenging since both required a financial commitment that the city was unwilling to make. The high value of village "reserve land" deterred the city from buying it, leaving it in the hands of the village. Reconstruction planning also faltered on financing. Government restrictions had explicitly excluded real estate developers from involvement, and the city did not want to directly invest themselves. This left financing up to the villagers, but they saw no reason to invest since they were earning a significant income from their rents and shares, which they did not want to lose.

In response to these difficulties, the planning group decided to demolish and reconstruct seven villages as "models" for subsequent efforts. They selected Leide, Linhe, Shipai, Xiancun, Yuancun, Yangji, and Sanyuanli, all located in central Guangzhou.¹⁸ Two of these villages were major obstacles to the new developments. Liede Village, located on the Pearl River, at the northern end of the New Pearl City development and Linhe, located just behind the new Guangzhou East train station, the gateway to the Tianhe District. Although the goal was the same to eliminate the villages, the municipal government had to proceed differently in each village.

Redeveloping Liede

By 2007, the need to redevelop Liede was urgent. The municipality perceived the village as an eyesore in the midst of its intensive

beautification efforts. Located just east of the new cultural district, it was adjacent to two key proposed monumental public projects, the Opera House, designed by Zaha Hadid, and the Guangdong Museum, designed by Rocco Yim. It was across the street from an important stadium site to be constructed for the Asian Games, which were held in Guangzhou in 2010. In spite of its current condition, Liede was an ancient village that traced its 800-year history back to the Song dynasty. It housed three different lineages—the Li, Liang, and Lin, each with its own ancestor halls.¹⁹ In 1994, the city had appropriated its farmland, formerly known for its fruit production, leaving the villagers with a small tract along the river. They developed this area intensively with a lucrative industrial zone, rental housing, and shops. With a rising return from their shares and rentals, prosperous villagers had no interest in participating in the reconstruction scheme, which they saw as a threat to their incomes.

In 2002 the government had succeeded in implementing two of the "four transformations" in Liede. An urban neighborhood committee replaced the village committee and the Liede Economic Development Ltd. replaced the village collective corporation. But this was as far as they could go; without major financial incentives, the Economic Development company, now the village's negotiating agent, continued to resist reconstruction.²⁰ Although it was clear that the city would ultimately succeed and villagers began to add extra stories to their houses in order to receive increased compensation, the villagers held out for a strong compensation package.

By May 2007, they had convinced Liede's village committee to agree

to reconstruction. The city would compensate them according to the rule, "deconstruct one square meter, compensate one square meter" (*chai yi bu yi 拆一補一*). In exchange for every square foot of legal village dwelling, a villager received the same square footage in a new apartment. For illegal property (anything over four stories, a widespread practice) they received 1,000 RMB per square meter as a "material compensation fee." In addition, villagers could buy extra square footage at a very low cost (3,500 RMB per square meter compared to the market price of 12,000 to 30,000 RMB per square meter). If they preferred cash, the compensation was 1,000 RMB per square meter. In addition, they would receive compensation to cover their move.²¹ In order to move ahead, the government lifted its restrictions on developers. The new mayor (Zhang Guangning) made a trip to Hong Kong to invite developers to take part in reconstructing urban villages. The city divided the village site into three parcels and auctioned off the largest to fund the reconstruction on

the rest of the land. Two Guangzhou and one Hong Kong developers successfully bid for the land, which came with planning permissions for intensive development with a high floor area ratio (FAR). The eastern end of the site was allocated to the villagers as new apartments. The middle site went to the villagers' collectively owned Star Hotel. And the west site went to the developers for building commercial and residential projects.²²

In October 2007, the village started tearing itself down one section at a time. All of the existing buildings in the village were demolished, including the 800-year-old Lingnan-style ancestor hall. Four households briefly held out for higher compensation until the Liede Economic Development Company sued them.²³ By 2008, the new apartments were under construction. Designed by the Guangdong Design Institute, they consisted of 37 closely packed high-rise apartment towers ranging from 20 to 40 stories. Apartments ranged

from 50 to 240 square meters, with the average around 120 meters. A typical apartment type was a three-bedroom, two-bath unit with an entrance garden and an L-shaped balcony. These were certainly far higher quality accommodation than anything in the old village and were comparable to what developers at the time advertised as "luxury housing."²⁴

The design institute also designed five enormous and elaborately reconstructed ancestor halls, loosely based on the village originals.²⁵ Villagers drew straws to distribute the apartments and on September 28, 2010, one month before the Asian Games began, they moved in. At this point they received urban *hukou*, the final erasure of their rural village identity. The new *hukou* allowed them the same access to education and social services as Guangzhou's urban residents.²⁶

This project was universally applauded in Guangzhou. The Xinhua News Agency called it a "triple-win



Image 2. Liede: Demolition begins, 2009. Photo by Marco Cenzatti.

success: the government successfully financed the reconstruction, funded some public service, the developers got prime land to build on in the heart of the new CBD, and the villagers got large modern apartments." Better still, given the need for fast-tracking important projects, the whole project had taken less than three years to complete. Leide became a paradigm for future village reconstruction: elimination of old village, reallocation of housing to villagers on site, based on equal floor area compensation, in high-rise luxury towers with a high FAR, all financed by an auction of village land.²⁷

New Planning Institutions

In 2009, with Leide's reconstruction well underway, the city established a new local government agency, the Guangzhou Urban Redevelopment Office, which was responsible for the demolition and redevelopment of "old city, old villages, and old factories." In spite of its successful outcome, the Leide process had been inefficient, time-consuming, and expensive. The new agency would regularize and streamline the process. The director of the office, Su Zequn, stated his goal as eliminating nine urban villages before the Asian Games, to open up 10,000 square meters for development. Linhe Village, close to the Tianhe Stadium, would be the first to go. The new agency closely followed Leide's example, as outlined above, with one significant exception. Instead of managing the redevelopment process, the government stepped back into an oversight role and allowed the village corporation, the Linhe Runyang Economic Development Company, Ltd., to take the lead in the process. The company worked directly with the developers, Sun Hung Kai

Properties from Hong Kong. Their main concern was to avoid the "rotten tail" problem visible all over Guangzhou, as developers ran out of money and abandoned partially completed projects. To assure the project's completion, they asked Sun Hung Kai Properties to pay 940 million RMB as deposit. The sum would guarantee the completion of the village's new housing towers.²⁸ Linhe's shareholders got an even better deal than Leide's. Many received multiple apartments. The village was destroyed in 2010 and villagers moved into the new project in 2012.²⁹

Although the pace was slower than what the officials and planners anticipated, the process of village elimination was inexorable. As this essay was written, out of the nine designated villages, only Linhe and Liede had been reconstructed. Yangji and Xiancun were in the demolition process at the time of writing; Shipai had completed the negotiation phase and the remaining villages were still negotiating. The other 129 urban villages left in Guangzhou's central city areas³⁰ will remain in this "urban redevelopment planning track," slated for destruction and redevelopment in the next decade.

In 2006, a major new village planning mandate appeared at the national level, spurred by continuing protests over land acquisition and compensation. The fourth session of the 11th National People's Congress proposed guidelines for "constructing a new socialist countryside." This formally assigned village planning to local planning bureaus and officially established the village as the smallest unit of Chinese planning. At the local level, following the Congress' guidelines, this generated an enormous planning mobilization. The "Greater Guangzhou Metropolis,"³¹

the area outside of the six central city districts covered by the urban redevelopment planning track, contained 1,100 administrative villages, or 4,300 natural villages. From 2006 to 2009, planners surveyed and created plans for all of the villages, enlisting assistance from not only the planning bureaus but also design institutes, private firms, and even students from local universities. In spite of this different administrative structure, the widely scattered locations of the villages, and their highly diverse histories, the plans for the "Socialist New Villages" envision futures that are remarkably similar to those of the urban villages. With the exception of historically and architecturally significant villages, which will be preserved, the long-term goal is to eliminate existing villages and resettle villagers in high-rise towers on a portion of their village land. Guangzhou will then acquire the remaining land and transform it into "construction land" for urban development, which will bring additional revenue to the city. One important goal is to eliminate the possibility of new urban villages, a process already underway in the peri-urban areas of the city.

Winners and Losers

Readers may ask, as one member of the audience did at a recent presentation about Guangzhou's urban villages, given by Helen Siu at UC Berkeley's Center for Chinese Studies, "What's the problem? The city government got land to develop, the villagers got new apartments and money. Nobody seems to have lost."³²

However, on closer examination, several categories of losers can be identified. The most obvious are the large number of migrant workers who have resided and continue to

reside in urban villages, typically outnumbering their village landlords. In Greater Guangzhou, there are villages completely inhabited by migrants, whose rents support the villagers living in modern apartments nearby. Since the only new housing being built in the city are luxury apartments, villages provide the only source of low-cost accommodation. Although small and sometimes substandard, these dwellings are popular not only with low-wage migrants but also attract young middle-class residents, other newcomers to the city, and even foreigners such as African merchants. The continuing destruction of urban villages forces them to relocate to other urban villages. The already overcrowded conditions will become worse. Since renters receive no compensation and many lost the deposits and fees they paid for their apartments, most ended up losing money as well as housing. Similarly, the migrants who operated most of the villages' retail and service enterprises have also lost their businesses which are difficult to relocate to new sites. Finally, the migrant's children, already disadvantaged in finding schools, have great difficulty in enrolling in new schools elsewhere. Where will they go when there are no urban villages left? The Guangzhou government has begun to construct public housing, but it is doubtful that it will accommodate even a fraction of the residents who have been expelled from villages. It is also unlikely that it will be available to migrants without Guangzhou hukou.

The city of Guangzhou is therefore also a loser, since it will have to cope with the social tensions and economic consequences created by the absence of affordable housing. It could also be argued that, apart from appearance, in most cases urban

villages are successful settlements, contributing to the city's economy and culture. In many cases, their dense fabric and low rents have encouraged the development of successful commercial districts catering to either specialized groups or selling specialized goods. Immigrants from other parts of China sell local products and open regional restaurants, introducing a new diversity into the city's overwhelmingly Cantonese culture. This has led many observers to remark that villages are the only cosmopolitan spaces in Guangzhou.

Perhaps even more important, the eradication of old villages and their replacement with high-rise buildings, disposed in super-blocks according to modernist site planning principles, eliminated every trace of settlement patterns that went back centuries and physically embodied the Lingnan culture of southern China. Their narrow lanes, small-scale urban fabric, enormous trees, and ancestor halls set along rivers or ponds were all emblematic of the lineage village, even if the housing had been replaced multiple times. The total erasure of such traditional spaces in Leide signaled that the mayor and municipal government considered them culturally meaningless.

Many of the urban village redesigns produced by foreign and local architecture and planning studios proposed improving infrastructure and upgrading and replacing substandard dwellings while preserving the scale, street patterns, and historical buildings in these villages, but neither the city nor the planning bureaus appear to have considered these alternatives. This is surprising, considering that most Chinese planners are familiar with Western planning principles. Jane Jacob's *Death and Life of Great American Cities* is a required text in the urban

planning curriculum in Guangzhou universities, yet its arguments against urban renewal do not appear to have influenced discussions of urban villages. Measured against the significant financial rewards that redeveloping village land can bring the city, these urban values and cultural values may appear trivial. Yet in the long run, it is likely that, as time passes, Guangzhou's planners and official will recognize and regret the loss of these irreplaceable urban spaces.

Finally and most tragically, the villagers also lost. With the demise of their village, their village identities will gradually dissolve. They may remain in their modern apartments on the site of the former village for a generation or two, but as they melt into Guangzhou's urban life, they can be expected to join the city's frantic real estate market and move on to other, less exceptional ways of living. Their village identities were double-edged. On the one hand, as "rural" residents in an urban setting, they had fewer benefits and opportunities than holders of Guangzhou hukou. Urbanites looked down upon them as uncultured and uneducated. But on the other hand, their unique territorial histories, ambiguous yet material claims to the land they occupied, electoral structure and lineage culture provided them with a degree of spatial, social, and financial autonomy rare in the contemporary Chinese city. These circumstances provided them with agency to shape the conditions of their lives and use them to their benefit, even if, in many cases, their power was potential rather than actualized. Even so, this constituted a genuine "bottom-up" urbanism in a city where top-down mandates play an ever-increasing role in city building. A further irony is the fact that, just as urban lineage villages are disappearing, interest in lineages, traditional practices and

ancestral villages is reemerging, among both local residents and overseas Chinese. You-Tien Hsing's study of Shipai village, based on her research done in 2003, ends with a cautiously optimistic evaluation of the possibilities of the new village corporations to control and maintain their spatial identity. However, ten years later, the subsequent events described in this chapter make it clear that the only power the

villagers have left is the ability to negotiate the conditions of their own demise.

The fate of the urban villages is sealed. But in Greater Guangzhou, given the sheer numbers of villages, the complex logistics involved in their redevelopment, and the significant resistance that can be expected to emerge, there is still the possibility of changing the urban values and

recognizing that villages can become active agents in the development of the region. In Guangzhou, as in the rest of China, the only constant is change. Given enough time, it is not only conceivable but likely that planners, officials, villagers, and city residents will reexamine the past and present circumstances of urbanizing villages and, it is to be hoped, rethink their futures.



Image 3. Leide in 2000.



Image 4. Leide in 2010. Note the completed megaprojects to the left of the former village. Photo by Google Earth.



Image 5. Leide: New village housing and reconstructed ancestor hall, 2011. Photo by Marco Cenzatti.

- The literature on urban villages in English and Chinese is enormous. Some examples include: You-tien Hsing, *The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); L. Tian, "The chengzhongcun land market in China: Boon or bane? A perspective of property rights," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32(2) (2008): 282–304; V. P. We, "Migrant housing in urban China: Choices and constraints," *Urban Affairs Review* 38 (1) (2002): 90–110; X. P. Yan and L. H. Wei, "The persistence or transformation of urban villages in urban China," *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen* 148 (5) (2004): 60–70; Lie Zhang, "Migrant enclaves and impacts of redevelopment policy in Chinese cities," in Lawrence Ma and Fulong Wu (eds.), *Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy, and Space* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 243–259; Yan Xiaopei, Lihua Wei, and Zhou Ruibo, "Transformation of urban village and feasible mode: Case studies of Guangzhou urban villages" (快速城市化地區城鄉關係協調研究: 以廣州市「城中村」改造為例), *City Planning (城市規劃)* 28(3) (2004): 30–38; Liu, "On the hampers of redevelopment of 'transitional community' under the high-speed urbanization in China: Cases in Guangzhou and Shenzhen," *Geographical Research* 129(14) (2010); L. Li, "Research on Guangzhou urban villages' formation and transformation mechanism" (廣州市城中村形成及改造機制研究) (Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University, 2001).
- A partial list includes the Graduate School of Design, Harvard University, the College of Environmental Design, UC Berkeley, National University of Singapore, the Berlage Institute (Netherlands), the Faculty of Architecture, University of Ferrara, Italy, the Aarhus School of Architecture, Denmark, and the Bergen School of Architecture, Norway.
- Guangzhou Government Office, *Several Opinions on Village and Town Construction and Improving Urbanization* by CCP Guangzhou Municipal Government (中共廣州市委廣州市人民政府關於加快村鎮建設步伐、推進城市化進程的若干意見), 2000.
- David Faure and Helen Siu, "Conclusion," in *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 1–20, 209–224.
- William L. Parish, *Chinese Rural Development: The Great Transformation* (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Jonathan Unter, *The Transformation of Rural China* (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village: Revolution to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
- Gregory Guldin, *What's a Peasant to Do? Village Becoming Town in Southern China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).
- Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Meyers, *Elections and Democracy in Greater China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Lianjiang Li and Kevin O'Brien, "The struggle over village elections," in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquahar (eds.), *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao*

- Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129–144.
8. Between 1979 and 2003, the built-up area grew from 87 sq. km to 240 sq. km, almost completely agricultural land obtained from villages. The Central Government gave Guangzhou the right to extend its administrative boundaries and it continued to grow. In 2005, it swallowed up most of the surrounding counties, becoming the “surrounding counties, Metropolis.”
 9. You-tien Hsing, *The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 122–145.
 10. An excellent description of this process can be found in Lanchih Po, “Property rights reforms in China,” *Urban Studies* 48(3) (February 2011): 509–528.
 11. J. Fan and W. Taubmann, “Migrant enclaves in large Chinese cities,” in J. R. Logan (ed.), *The New Chinese City: Globalization and Market Reform* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 157–183.
 12. Lanchih Po, “Redefining rural collectives in China: Land conversion and the emergence of rural shareholding co-operatives,” *Urban Studies* 45(8): 1603–1623.
 13. Michael J. Enright, Edith E. Scott, Kamun Chang (ed.), *Regional Powerhouse: The Greater Pearl River Delta and the Rise of China* (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2005).
 14. *Nanfang Daily*, “Records of ‘medium changes’ of Guangzhou city construction event” (廣州城市建設「中變」大事記), October 19, 2001, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2001-10-19/381715.html>.
 15. Unlike the village committees, the urban citizens’ committee was not directly elected and had much less power.
 16. The “four transformations” were translated into the following government documents and regulations: “Guangzhou village and town management regulations” (廣州市村鎮建設管理規定), “Guangzhou villagers construction land management regulation” (廣州市農村村民住宅建設用地管理規定), “Guangzhou village real estate ownership registration regulation” (廣州市農村房地產產權登記規定), “Guangzhou village planning management regulation” (廣州市村莊規劃管理規定), “Guangzhou urban village temporary redevelopment regulation” (廣州市城中村改造管理暫行規定).
 17. Yuanyuan Lian, “The research on ‘The Mode of Compensation and Resettlement’ in Liede VIC reform” (城中村改造模式研究：以廣州市天河區獵德村為例) (Jinan University, 2009): 8–18.
 18. Guangzhou Government Office, *Several Opinions about “Urban Village” Redevelopment from Guangzhou Municipality* (Guangzhou Government Office 2002, No. 17) (廣州市關於「城中村」改制工作的若干意見(穗辦2002第17號)), 2002. “Preservation and reconstruction urban villages in Guangzhou,” <http://www.newsgd.com/news/GDNews/content/2011-06>. Accessed December 9, 2012.
 19. Apart from the three main lineages, Liede also had a history of absorbing migrants. According to the government’s census, in 2004, the total villagers’ population was 4,741 (not including the migrants who do not hold Liede rural *houkou*), with 81 different family names.
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 22. West of bridge site: 93,928 square meters, with 6 to 7 FAR, for commercial and residential buildings; east of bridge site: 127,883 square meters, with 5.2 FAR, for 37 residential towers and public service; southwest of bridge site: 32,446 square meters, with 5.3 FAR, for Liede Company’s Star Hotel. The calculation is based on “Planning scheme of Liede village reconstruction” by the Architecture Design and Research Institute of Guangdong Province.
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 30. Including Baiyun District (白雲區), Yuexiu District (越秀區), Tianhe District (天河區), Luogang District (蘿崗區), and Panyu District (番禺區).
 31. In April 2005, Guangzhou expanded its administrative area. The “Greater Guangzhou Metropolis” area covers the Guangzhou Central City Area (previously called Guangzhou City), Panyu District (which was Panyu City), Huadu District (which was Huadu City), Zengcheng City, and Conghua City.
 32. “Financial tsunami meets village,” lecture given by Professor Helen Siu of Yale University, at the Center for Chinese Studies, UC Berkeley, April 10, 2010.